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ABSTRACT
The research in this paper will seek to ascertain the extent of
personal data entry and collection required to enjoy at least the
minimal promised benefits of distributed intelligence and
monitoring in the home. Particular attention will be given to the
abilities and sensitivities of the population most likely to need
these devices, notably the elderly and disabled. The paper will
then evaluate whether existing legal limitations on the collection,
maintenance, and use of such data are applicable to devices
currently in use in the home environment and whether such
regulations effectively protect privacy. Finally, given
appropriate policy parameters, the paper will offer proposals to
effectuate reasonable and practical privacy-protective solutions
for developers and consumers.

INTRODUCTION
This article focuses on one subset of the Internet of Things (IoT)1
revolution, home monitoring technologies. The use of IoT home
monitoring technologies especially affects elderly populations using
these devices and systems in their homes. The selection of these
technologies is not random; in fact, watching the development of these
technologies serves as a forecast for the problems inherent in and
indicative of future use of similar technologies, the “canary in the
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1
Internet of Things, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.
com/us/definition/american_english/Internet-of-things (last visited Nov. 26,
2015) (defining Internet of Things as the “interconnection via the Internet of
computing devices embedded in everyday objects, enabling them to send and
receive data”).
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coalmine” for the IoT.2 Use of IoT home monitoring technologies for the
elderly is at this time preliminary as not every household is so equipped.
While we may see these devices as necessary and desirable for
vulnerable populations, once they become more available, the use of IoT
home monitoring devices will become as ubiquitous as other mobile
devices. Now is the opportune time to evaluate the privacy implications
of these new technologies, before their intrusions become part of the
fabric of everyday life.
Further highlighting the importance of these new technologies is
the recent Federal Trade Commission (FTC) staff report on IoT, which
specifically mentions home monitoring technologies. For example:
[H]ome automation systems that turn on your front porch light
when you leave work; . . . These are all examples of the Internet of
Things (“IoT”), an interconnected environment where all manner of
objects have a digital presence and the ability to communicate with
other objects and people. The IoT explosion is already around us, in
the form of . . . connected smoke detectors and light bulbs.3

What are the consequences of collecting this data in the home?
The consequences are of three types: (1) the effect on individual
behavior and well-being, (2) the effect on corporations and their ability
to do business in new and unusual ways,4 and (3) the effect on

2

FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS WORKSHOP 177, at ll. 12–20
(2013), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/Internetthings-privacy-security-connected-world/final_transcript.pdf [hereinafter IOT
WORKSHOP] (“[T]here can be amazing benefits, but at the same time, there is a
potential for some serious harm, especially in tele-health and health applications.
I consider that sort of the canary in the coalmine for the Internet of Things. If
bad things start happening with tele-health and health applications, you are
going to see that sort of poison the well, so to speak, for a whole lot of
additional kinds of connected applications.” (Joseph Lorenzo Hall, the chief
technologist at the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT))).
3
FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 1 (2015), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshopentitled-Internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf [hereinafter IOT CONNECTED
WORLD].
4
Max Chafkin, 41. SamsungInternet, FAST COMPANY: MOST INNOVATIVE
COMPANIES 2015 (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.fastcompany.com/3039597/mostinnovative-companies-2015/samsung (“‘Imagine a world in which these [home]
appliances are connected to each other,’ says David Eun, a Samsung executive
vice president. ‘What you’d have is one of the largest platforms for distributing
content and services and apps—even ads.’ . . . [SmartThings is a] “Silicon
Valley startup [that] offers a kit that makes it easy for consumers control

194

WEATHERING THE NEST

[Vol. 14

government action. As for the last effect, if the resulting government
regulation is unable to protect U.S. consumers, other solutions must be
sought.
In evaluating these technologies, we should first consider the
benefits to consumers. Home monitoring technologies upgrade the
consumer and the consumer’s home to a higher standard of living at a
low cost. In the case of monitoring elderly and disabled consumers, the
cost of a home health care aide may be excessive or prohibitive,5 relative
to purchasing a small device, even with monthly fees. Thus, because just
the necessary devices may be purchased, the home monitoring system
may be more cost-effective as well as more structurally flexible to scale
up and down based on individual needs for assistance. Further, empirical
studies have shown that older individuals value home monitoring devices
because such devices allow them to age in place, among other reasons.6
Next, we should question the amount of private information
traded for the use of these new technologies. There is some room for
individual variance, but there is also a threshold level of information
required for basic participation. Each user must consider how much
individual or family information she is willing to upload into the
thermostat or medical alert device in order for the device to function
optimally. In many cases, the elderly, and particularly the frail or
disabled elderly, are willing to downgrade the general expectation of
privacy in order to receive the benefits of safety and monitoring
technology in the home.7
Schlage door locks, GE lightbulbs, Sonos sound systems, and, as a result of the
acquisition, all of Samsung's smart appliances.”).
5
Based on 44 hours per week by 52 weeks, the annual estimated cost of a health
care aide is $45,760. Compare Long Term Care Costs Across the United States,
GENWORTH (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.genworth.com/corporate/aboutgenworth/industry-expertise/cost-of-care.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2015).
6
Veerle Claes, et al., Attitudes and Perceptions of Adults of 60 Years and Older
Towards In-Home Monitoring of the Activities of Daily Living with Contactless
Sensors: An Explorative Study, 52 INT’L J. OF NURSING STUDIES 134, 134 (2014)
(“[D]escriptive statistics indicate that adults of 60 years and older find
contactless monitoring useful for various purposes (e.g. to remain living at home
longer, safely and independently; for timely detection of emergency situations
and gradually emerging health problems).”).
7
See Daphne Townsend, et al., Privacy Versus Autonomy: A Tradeoff Model for
Smart Home Monitoring Technologies, 33RD ANNUAL INT’L CONFERENCE OF
THE IEEE-EMBS 4749, 4749 (2011) (“Older adults are willing to trade privacy
(by accepting a monitoring technology), for autonomy. As the information
captured by the sensor becomes more intrusive and the infringement on privacy
increases, sensors are accepted if the loss in privacy is traded for autonomy.
Even video cameras, the most intrusive sensor type were accepted in exchange
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When home monitoring technologies are first used, there may be
different privacy concerns for different types of collected data. For
example, data on the temperature of the home may cause less of a
concern than data on insulin levels. Much of existing law revolves
around which data is sensitive and which is available for public
consumption. For now, there is a heightened sensitivity to video capture
and a lesser willingness to trade video for safety, except in the most
extreme circumstance – the total obliteration of privacy associated with
assisted living.8
There will be less of a distinction in sensitivity of information,
however, when all of it is combined in a single platform. Indeed, there
has been an increasing ability of data processors to capture multiple data
points and either enter them into algorithms or combine them into a
unified picture of a person. Even seemingly innocuous pieces of
information may have economic or strategic value under these
circumstances. Combined and cross-referenced data can fit into a mosaic
of information that replicates an identity of an individual with increasing
ease and accuracy. What we think of as autonomous artificial
intelligence may already be in play, and we are creating it ourselves.
Therefore, when we evaluate the exchange of personal data and
privacy for convenience and access, we will need to look far beyond the
immediate time and place, and even the present-day user. A simple
transactional analysis of entering your name, address, or telephone
number into a single monitoring device is a limited field of study. We
can peer into the future of home monitoring, which has been explored in
some detail in science fiction if not legal analysis. Futurists have offered
a wealth of analysis, speculation, and science fiction about the dystopian
eventuality of autonomous devices that begin to think on their own and
operate on their own. In many cases, the scenarios envision a variety of
individual electronic elements doing each and both of these activities
better, faster, and with more or less humanity than humans. In the most
frighteningly imaginative hypotheticals, the information humans have
for the height of autonomy which is to remain in the home.”). The author’s
literature review included articles in which seniors were polled on a wide variety
of technologies, namely, “[w]earable sensors were predominantly location and
physiological monitoring. Environmental sensors included switches, stove
temperature sensors, video and infrared cameras, bed occupancy and bed-based
heart rate and respiration monitoring. A few focus groups presented implanted
physiological and location monitoring chips to participants.” Id. at 4750.
8
See id. at 4750, 4752 (“Video monitoring has a high loss of privacy and a
moderate gain in autonomy hence it is ranked last. . . . Even video cameras, the
most intrusive sensor type were accepted in exchange for the height of
autonomy remaining in the home.”).
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fed into the machines results in a collective, conscious intelligence that
surpasses what humans can do or control.
In this article, we will focus on the realistic aspects of existing
privacy law as applied to home monitoring technologies, to see what
works and what falls short. This Introduction has introduced the concept
of privacy for the relatively new technologies of home monitoring.
Section I will review the existing law as it applies to these technologies.
Section II and III will discuss the serious consequences to leaving these
technologies occasionally and loosely regulated. Section IV will offer
constructive solutions to bridge the gap between unregulated
technologies and fully regulated technologies. Lastly, the Conclusion
will offer remarks and suggestions for future research.

I. EXISTING PRIVACY LAWS FOR HOME MONITORING DEVICES,
SERVICES, AND APPLICATIONS
A. Privacy and Technology, Past and Present
Historically, privacy law in the United States has responded to
technologies that non-physically invade the home and its private sphere,
seeking to protect the right to be left alone.9 The privacy right at issue for
home monitoring, however, is the right to control access to personal
information, and the rights of notice and consent for the distribution of
such information.10 It is the right not to have data extracted from one’s
private life, and the right to be free from the abuse of your private data

9

See Benjamin Wittes, Databuse: Digital Privacy and the Mosaic, THE
BROOKINGS INST. 8 (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research
/papers/2011/04/01-databuse-wittes#_ftnref8 (“The 1890 publication of
Samuel Warren's and Louis Brandeis's seminal law review article, ‘The
Right to Privacy,’ and Brandeis's subsequent dissent in the 1928 Supreme
Court case of Olmstead v. United States—were pivotal in crafting modern
American attitudes in law, policy, and culture alike towards the concept of
privacy. . . . The Right to Privacy responded to the invention of the instant
camera and its use by the press to report on famous people. The Brandeis
dissent responded to the development of wiretapping technology.”); Samuel
D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195 (1890); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (taking the continuing stand on the issue).
10
The FTC articulated these basic principles for online privacy in 2000. See
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN
THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE (2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default
/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-electronicmarketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000.pdf.
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by others. This is a concept one scholar has termed “databuse.”11 Thus,
we need to move away from legal precedents that consider the home the
boundary for personal privacy and toward legal frameworks that reflect
the technologies we have, which allow for access to the home and to
private information in unprecedented ways.
To access the home and its wealth of private and perhaps
valuable data, home monitoring companies are moving into a sacred
space. A person’s home is her “castle,”12 and she is the queen of this
domain and its primary decision-maker. Historically, “the house of
everyone is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defense
against injury and violence, as for his repose.”13 It is time to consider
whether the castle’s threshold, both literally/physically and
figuratively/legally, can hold back the onslaught of privacy intrusions.
Into the early twenty-first century, privacy in the home has been
given significant judicial deference in evaluating whether a Fourth
Amendment search and seizure violation has occurred. In Kyllo v. United
States,14 the Court held that when the government uses a device that is
not in general public use to explore details of a private home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a Fourth Amendment "search," and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant. Note that Kyllo turns on the uniqueness
of the government’s access to high technology. But home monitoring
may at some point become ubiquitous. When this occurs, would listening
to someone’s home monitoring devices be like looking in an open
window? Yes, if it is a greenhouse and not the residence per se,15 but no,
if it is inside the house or on the porch. According to Justice Scalia in
Florida v. Jardines: “When it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the
home is first among equals . . . This right would be of little practical
value if the state’s agents could stand in a home’s porch or side garden
and trawl for evidence with impunity.”16
The state’s corresponding obligation to respect the home’s “wellbeing, tranquility, and privacy” is an interest “of the highest order in a

11

See Wittes, supra note 9 (“The relevant concept is not, in my judgment,
protecting some elusive positive right of user privacy but, rather, protecting a
negative right—a right against the unjustified deployment of user data in a
fashion adverse to the user's interests, a right, we might say, against.”).
12
The first legal mention of home equals castle is found in Semayne's Case, 77
ENG. REP. 194 (K.B. 1603).
13
Id.
14
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
15
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989).
16
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).
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free and civilized society.”17 Now uncontroversial, “Supreme Court
justices of all stripes today accept that the Fourth Amendment reaches
beyond the technology of the eighteenth century and requires application
to today's analogous intrusions.”18
Corporate policies, at least on the surface, reflect this legal
precedent. Nest Labs, maker of home automation devices, headlines a
section of its privacy policy with “[w]e believe home is a private
place.”19 Yet, Nest Labs collects and processes many data points through
its devices,20 with the idea that more data is better.21 More data may not

17

Jordan C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconsitutional
Status and the Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 INDIANA L.J. 355, 401 (2010)
(citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)).
18
Wittes, supra note 9. See e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
19
Privacy, NEST (June 17, 2005) https://nest.com/privacy/.
20
See Privacy Statement for Nest Products and Services, NEST (June 17, 2015)
https://nest.com/legal/privacy-statement/ [hereinafter Nest Privacy Statement]
(“What information does the Nest Learning Thermostat collect? The Nest
Learning Thermostat collects: Information input during setup, Environmental
data from the Nest Learning Thermostat’s sensors, Direct temperature
adjustments to the device, Heating and cooling usage information, Technical
information from the device. . . . They can also sense whether something in the
room is moving. . . . Nest Protect can do things like detect smoke and CO in
your home, and give you alarms and warnings. For example, if Nest Protect sees
that smoke or CO levels are rising, it will give you a Heads Up before the
danger reaches emergency alarm levels and tell you what the danger is.”
(emphasis added)); Privacy Policy for Nest Web Sites, NEST (June 17, 2015),
https://nest.com/legal/privacy-policy-for-nest-web-sites (“If you are logged into
your Nest account, we record the IP address you visit our website from, and if
you have a Nest device or other connected device, we record adjustments you
make to the product through the website interface. We store this data along with
your email address, information about your Nest device, data collected directly
by the device, a history of your device settings, and any other information we
have collected about your use of Nest products and services. See our Privacy
Statement for Nest Products and Services to learn more about the usage
information collected through our products.”).
21
See Frequently Asked Questions About Nest Aware with Video History, NEST
(Jun. 18, 2015), https://nest.com/support/article/Frequently-asked-questionsabout-Nest-Aware-with-Video-History (“Nest Aware is a paid subscription
service that makes your Nest Cam even better with additional features and
services. It includes video history, video clips and timelapses, activity zones and
improved activity alerts.”). The Nest Aware service now saves video for future
review with video history subscription with up to 30 days saved for review.
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be better, though, if third-party marketing agencies or government
entities can access and subpoena that information.22
Government entities, however, can access data using less
transparent and more direct methodologies than the traditional subpoena.
In this vein, the government has been “piggybacking” on more advanced
corporate monitoring technologies instead of acting through their own
technologies.23 Police departments use third-party contractors to access a
wider variety of surveillance techniques, including cameras, which can
monitor public streets, and possibly workplaces and homes.24 The
judicial system must observe this relationship between the government
and its corporate subcontractors in its interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment and its constitutional companions.
Additionally, the privacy of personal data has historically been
protected by relying on contract principles, including the individual’s
right to notice and the requirement of consent.25 These rights may falter,
however, if sacrificing privacy means the device saving a life. It should
be the individual or family, though, who determines how to balance
privacy and a device’s efficacy.26
22

Cf. Nate Cardozo, et al., Who Has Your Back? Elec. Frontier Found. (May 15,
2014), https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-2014 (explaining Nest’s parent
company, Google, has received six stars, a perfect score, in fighting data
requests).
23
See Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS.
L.J. 1309, 1311 (2012) (“As the surveillance society expands, the police will
learn to rely more on the products of private surveillance, and will shift their
time, energy, and money away from traditional self-help policing, becoming
passive consumers rather than active producers of surveillance. Private industry
is destined to become the unwitting research and development arm of the FBI. If
we continue to interpret the Fourth Amendment as we always have, we will find
ourselves not only in a surveillance society, but also in a surveillance state.”).
24
See David Sasaki, SeeChange, DAVIDSASAKI.NAME (Mar. 3, 2014),
http://davidsasaki.name/2014/03/seechange/ (“What did surprise me, what really
blew my mind, was the off-handed mention that, in addition to NYPD’s own
3,000 cameras, they also had access to 23,000 streaming cameras placed in
residential buildings by the private security firm, SecureWatch24.”).
25
See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, We Can’t Wait:
Obama Administration Unveils Blueprint for a “Privacy Bill of Rights” to
Protect Consumers Online (Feb. 23, 2012) https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2012/02/23/we-can-t-wait-obama-administration-unveils-blueprintprivacy-bill-rights (“[C]onsumers have a right to easily understandable
information about privacy and security practices.”).
26
See Diane F. Mahoney, et al., In-home Monitoring of Persons with Dementia:
Ethical Guidelines for Technology Research and Development, 3 ALZHEIMER’S
& DEMENTIA 217, 220 (2007) (“Both in the home and in the investigator’s
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B. Regulation
Who is monitoring these monitors? The IoT industry is largely
unregulated, especially when compared to how human in-home health
care and 911 services are regulated. Regulations for human in-home care
span health and financial concerns, and 911 service technologies are
regulated by the FCC.27 By contrast, while government agencies have
monitored portions of the IoT industry, no one agency has been tasked
with looking at the ecosystem as a whole to address concerns about
security or privacy.28 As a result of this patchwork regulation, statutory
support for consumer privacy in monitoring devices is insufficient.
Unfortunately, in order to achieve a fully regulated industry, radical
change is needed.29
This is largely because any checks on the industry are marketdriven. The wide-ranging level of staff training within the industry is a
case in point.30 And while broader health care, financial data, and data
laboratory, the gathering, storage, and retrieval of information from such
systems must have safeguards built in, to ensure that they meet legal and ethical
standards. Research protocols should include specific statements about how
privacy and confidentiality considerations will be handled.”).
27
Home Care Regulatory Issues, NAT’L ASSOC. FOR HOME CARE & HOSPICE,
http://www.nahc.org/advocacy-policy/home-care-regulatory-issues/ (last visited
Nov. 26, 2015); Intrado, the primary provider of 911 service, notes on its
website that FCC regulations have covered 911, E911, and VoIP technologies.
FCC E911 Legislation, INTRADO INC., http://www1.911enable.com/resourcecenter/fcc-e911-legislation (last visited Dec. 27, 2015). The company’s products
only extend from enterprise to small and medium businesses, but not to
consumer use. See Company Overview, INTRADO INC., http://www1.911enable.
com/about-us/company-overview (last visited Dec. 27, 2015).
28
See IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 184 (“[N]o regulatory agency was
looking at the security of these devices. The FCC said, that's not us. The FCC
looks at the way the radio transmits, not what is being transmitted. And the FDA
said, it's not us. We look at how the medical part of it works. And it turns out
that there is this huge gap, that nobody is looking at the security of these devices
from a cyber security perspective, from a connected device perspective.”).
29
Scott Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 132
(2014) (“The FTC’s standard . . . may mean that in the end all biometric and
sensor-based Internet of Things data need to be treated as [Personally
Identifiable Information] (PII). That, however, would require a radical reworking of current law and practice.” (relying upon FED. TRADE COMM’N,
PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012)).
30
Compare Medical Alert Questions, LIFESTATION, http://www1.lifestation.
com/faq.php#q33top10 (last visited Nov. 26, 2015) (“What kind of training do
LifeStation Care Specialists receive? All LifeStation personnel begin their
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breach regulations may indirectly touch the industry, those that would
have any real effect have not yet passed. Thus, regulation is currently not
only lacking in teeth, it also lacks a “mouth.”31
So much of our privacy landscape has been built upon U.S.
squeamishness about revealing healthcare data. We do have the federal
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),
as amended and supplemented. The privacy rule for HIPAA “establishes
national standards to protect individuals’ medical records and other
personal health information and applies to health plans, health care
clearinghouses, and those health care providers that conduct certain
health care transactions electronically.”32 For home monitoring, the
subset of data that is medical data might be regulated under HIPAA.
However, HIPAA applies to some medical data collected from
consumers but certainly not all. In fact, it skirts much of home
monitoring entirely, either because the industry does not collect
applicable data or covered providers are not involved in home
monitoring.33 Therefore, if the entity gathering health data is not a
education process with formal classroom training followed by mandatory
examinations at the end of each module. This period is followed by practical
application training under the guidance of CSAA Certified instructors.
Following the new hire training process, all personnel are subject to
performance reviews on a weekly basis for their first 3 months of service.
Thereafter, all reviews are on a quarterly basis.”) with Kate Rauch, 10 Questions
to Ask When Shopping for a Personal Emergency Response System (PERS),
CARING.COM, https://www.caring.com/checklists/personal-emergency-responsequestions (last visited Dec. 27, 2015) (“How is the response center staff trained?
There's no government-regulated PERS staff training or certification
requirements, so companies train their staff in a variety of ways.”).
31
For example, the Administration Discussion Draft: Consumer Privacy Bill of
Rights Act of 2015 proclaims that, “[i]t is the sense of Congress that each
covered entity should provide, when reasonable, a version of the notice required
under this Act in a format that is computer-readable . . . .” THE WHITE HOUSE,
ADMINISTRATION DISCUSSION DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS
ACT OF 2015, 1 (proposed Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cpbr-act-of-2015-discussiondraft.pdf [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF
RIGHTS ACT]. In other words, here’s an idea, if it’s ok with you, you might want
to consider doing this. Also, you’ve got 18 months post-data collection to do
whatever you want with the data collected without fear of civil penalties. Id. at
18.
32
The HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/privacyrule/index.html
(last visited Dec. 27, 2015).
33
IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 179, ll. 16–23 (“And one of the big problems
here is a lot of consumer-facing health applications aren't governed by HIPAA.
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covered provider like a hospital or medical care provider, there is no
protection from HIPAA.
United States privacy law also strongly values the individual and
personal nature of financial information. However, the FTC dismisses
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) as a potential check on the
unlimited collection and use of data from IoT devices.34 The FTC also
notes that its own jurisdiction is limited,35 and calls instead for federal
legislation on privacy and security for the IoT. Nevertheless, the FTC
promises it will police violations of both “reasonable security” and the
FCRA in a limited way.36
With regard to users who are both elderly and disabled, the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires, with some exceptions,
that “information obtained regarding the medical condition or history of
the applicant is collected and maintained on separate forms and in
separate medical files and is treated as a confidential medical record[.]”37
However, this privacy restriction is limited to the employment context.
Employers are the covered entities for the ADA, and while employers are
interested in home monitoring of their employees, we still have very few
home monitoring devices placed in the home by employers. Regulations
for educational institutions and public places also seem like remote
connections for home monitoring oversight. Monitoring of employees,
students, and the public is an important issue of privacy law, but beyond
the scope of this article. Nevertheless, ADA standards may be useful by
They are not something provided by a covered entity, they are not a PHR, they
are not a personal health record, so they may not have to deal with the breach
notification rules. They may at the state level, but not the ones that are now in
HIPAA via HITECH.” (quoting Joseph Lorenzo Hall of CDT)).
34
IOT CONNECTED WORLD, supra note 3, at 17 (“[T]he FCRA excludes most
“first parties” that collect consumer information; thus, it would not generally
cover IoT device manufacturers that do their own in-house analytics. Nor
would the FCRA cover companies that collect data directly from consumers’
connected devices and then use that data to make in-house credit, insurance,
or other eligibility decisions – something that could become increasingly
common as the IoT develops.”).
35
Id. at viii (“Although the Commission currently has authority to take action
against some IoT-related practices, it cannot mandate certain basic privacy
protections – such as privacy disclosures or consumer choice – absent a specific
showing of deception or unfairness.”).
36
Id. at 53 (“[We] will continue to look for cases involving companies making
IoT devices that, among other things, do not maintain reasonable security, make
misrepresentations about their privacy practices, or violate the requirements of
the FCRA when they use information for credit, employment, insurance, or
other eligibility decisions.”).
37
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B) (2012).
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analogy when discussing standards for notice and transparency for
elderly and disabled users in the solutions section of this article.
Without a coherent federal data breach strategy, the states have
stepped in to provide various data breach laws, with varying standards.
But no state law addresses home monitoring data or IoT data overall,
protects it, or requires IoT data breach notification.38
For example, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA),39 the California erasure law, and other age-based statutes may
serve as useful analogies for developing privacy protections for the aging
population. But the issues turn on obtaining effective consent from a
competent individual, and on protecting data that may be collected from
some individuals based on age. COPPA requires that website operators
obtain verifiable consent from parents, which is difficult to do because
parents are often not the actual users. Similarly, in the context of the
elderly who have been adjudicated as legally incompetent, or are
functionally unable to give legal consent despite the lack of such
adjudication, and are using IoT devices, it would be hard to obtain
consent from other family members because it is not their data that is
being collected. Matters are somewhat complicated by the fact that the
elderly may be legally and financially able to purchase home monitoring
devices, unlike children, but may be unable to fully comprehend that data
is being collected. Additionally, they may not understand the
consequences of collecting that data.
Regulation of home monitoring devices is therefore incomplete
at best, pending in several jurisdictions on a more general level but not
specific to IoT devices, and desperately in need of a back-up plan to
support consumer privacy. At a minimum, if we cannot restrict data
collection and use from home monitoring devices—although we should
not abandon this effort—we may be able to restrict after-market use of
the data for discriminatory purposes. There is a particular need to guard
against using data gathered from monitoring devices to discriminate
against populations required to use such devices for life-saving measures.
Insurers’ use of in-home monitoring device data is the most obvious
place to begin, which could lead to increased insurance rates based on
previously undisclosed or even misinterpreted data, but in nearly all
instances is still seen as invasive.40 Also, IoT data may be subpoenaed in
39

15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012).
15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012).
40
Peppet, supra note 29, at 155–56 (“One can easily imagine health and life
insurers demanding or seeking access to fitness and health sensor data, or home
insurers demanding access to home-monitoring system data. As such data
become more detailed, sensitive, and revealing, states might consider prohibiting
39
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cases related to end-of-life and estate decisions made by family members
and related life insurance companies. Thus, in order to create an
ecosystem of privacy and security for these devices, we will have to look
first to the companies themselves.

C. Industry Standards
In the absence of comprehensive regulation, our next hope for
protecting consumer privacy would be industry standards. In fact, there
has recently been some movement toward industry standards and the
establishment of best practices in lieu of government regulation. Industry
privacy standards for data security include de-identification of personal
data41 and encryption. The FTC has requested that companies assess and
test their security measures as well as minimize the data that they
collect,42 The data minimization standard alone contains several
recommendations and concerns. For instance, data can be collected later,
or companies can destroy data no longer in use.43 Although data
minimization works in theory, it often fails in practice. For example, a
listening TV picks up everything said in the room, not just “turn on
TV,”44 and transmits it to the Internet. Data minimization is thus at odds
with the essence of home monitoring IoT, which is constant monitoring
and data collection.
insurers from conditioning coverage on their revelation . . . Although such
information might be useful to a home insurer to investigate a fire or casualty
claim, it seems invasive to permit insurers to demand such detailed information
as a condition of insurance.”).
41
But see Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1705 (2010) (“Every successful
reidentification, even one that reveals seemingly nonsensitive data like movie
ratings, abets future reidentification.” (quoting Paul Ohm)).
42
IOT CONNECTED WORLD, supra note 3, at iii (“[C]ompanies should consider:
(1) conducting a privacy or security risk assessment, (2) minimizing the data
they collect and retain, and (3) testing their security measures before launching
their products.”).
43
IOT CONNECTED WORLD, supra note 3, at iv (“[S]taff’s recommendation on
data minimization is a flexible one that gives companies many options. They can
decide not to collect data at all; collect only the fields of data necessary to the
product or service being offered; collect data that is less sensitive; or de-identify
the data they collect.”).
44
Bruce Schneier, Your TV May Be Watching You, CNN (Feb. 12, 2015, 9:16
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/11/opinion/schneier-samsung-tv-listening/
(“We need more explicit conversation about the value of being able to speak
freely in our living rooms without our televisions listening, or having e-mail
conversations without Google or the government listening. Privacy is a
prerequisite for free expression, and losing that would be an enormous blow to
our society.”).
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Nevertheless, data minimization is crucial given this vastness of
data collection. When large collections of data aggregate on identifiable
platforms or within targetable databases, the danger of breach escalates.
Newly-revised data breach laws in California promise notification postbreach, but plans for preventing access and breaches remain elusive.
Further, recommendations for data protection regulations in the United
States have focused on the collection and storage by large databases.45
However, smaller providers often collect the information collected by
home monitoring devices, and any breaches would slip through the gaps
in these regulations. The next section of this article will evaluate what
home monitoring device companies are doing to keep their devices and
systems secure and the data contained in their systems private.

II. IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY
A. Security Ecosystems for Home Monitoring Devices
Data security is a precondition of privacy protection. The FTC
met in November 2013 to hear comments on IoT, and issued a staff
report in January 2015. The commenters focused on three areas of harm
from security breaches of IoT, including personal information, personal
safety, and other systems.46 Thus, companies should consider both
physical security, including locked doors and facilities, and network
security, including authentication and back-up protocols.
There are exponentially more security issues in a distributed
system vis-à-vis a centralized system such as a single data center. IoT
presents several additional levels of security issues, from the device to
the network to the collection or storage of data.47 This is because the
45

See Ohm, supra note 23, at 1760; see also THE WHITE HOUSE, THE PERSONAL
DATA NOTIFICATION & PROTECTION ACT, 2 (proposed Jan. 12, 2015),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/updateddata-breach-notification.pdf (addressing data breach notice requirements for
“[a]ny business entity engaged in or affecting interstate commerce, that uses,
accesses, transmits, stores, disposes of or collects sensitive personally
identifiable information about more than 10,000 individuals during any 12month period”).
46
IOT CONNECTED WORLD, supra note 3, at ii (“[P]articipants noted that the IoT
presents a variety of potential security risks that could be exploited to harm
consumers by: (1) enabling unauthorized access and misuse of personal
information, (2) facilitating attacks on other systems, and (3) creating risks to
personal safety.”).
47
IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 71–72, ll. 11–25, 1–6 (“[A] couple of quick
comments on the security issues that are raised by things in the home. I think
that you have to worry also about the way that the wireless networking exposes
data to interception. We are wary that industries who are moving into this space
are not necessarily as mature about the security issues as those as, say, at
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security of connecting an IoT device to a home network relies on the
security of the home network itself, which may not be secure at all.48
What can go wrong when a home network security is breached?
First, lax design of security cameras may permit hackers to access live
feeds and make them available to the Internet. Cameras, the eyes and
often ears of home monitoring, are used to monitor the security of both
individuals and property, but may in fact endanger both. The FTC found
that the online security cameras made by TRENDnet were easily
hacked.49 The resulting enforcement action against TRENDnet set the
standard for future FTC prosecutions of home monitoring networks.
Second, traditional malware, viruses, and worms can infest a
home network. Creators of these malware, virus, and worms can either
incidentally or specifically target50 home monitoring devices. A worm,
for example, “can be utilized by the attackers to perform distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.”51 A DDoS attack could wipe out an
entire system, leading to shut down of power, light, or other connected
systems in the home. Unfortunately, there is not much in the way of
financial incentives to build IoT devices with even the most basic
security envelopes as the devices are usually inexpensive and
unregulated consumer devices. Similarly, there is no financial incentive
to upgrade the device with security patches and new versions. Some
Microsoft. The relatively cheap or lower grade devices may lack the computing
resources or, for economic reasons, there will be less incentive to put good
security in them. And fourth, that the security perimeter for IoT devices is
actually rather different because, depending on where the endpoint devices are,
there may be a higher risk of direct tampering. And there is also a likelihood of
multiple or changing environments that IoT devices are expected to operate in,
where they will connect promiscuously, don't necessarily have the ability to
really know what kind of configuration of what the other device is going to be
like.” (quoting Lee Tien of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF))).
48
Id. at 101–04, ll. 6–25, 1–15 (quoting Jeff Hagins, the cofounder and chief
technology officer at SmartThings, explaining that the security of a whole
system of IoT is only as strong as the security of home wifi network, and that
there are defects with the widely used WPS wifi encryption technology).
49
Id. at 13, ll. 1–6 (“[I]n the FTC's first enforcement foray into the Internet of
Things, we alleged that TRENDnet's lax software design and testing of its IPconnected security cameras enabled a hacker to get his hands on the live feeds
from 700 cameras and make them available on the Internet.”).
50
E.g., Dick O’Brien, The Internet of Things: New Threats Emerge
in a Connected World, SYMANTEC (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.symantec.
com/connect/blogs/internet-things-new-threats-emerge-connected-world (“The
attacker was in a position to begin attack[ing] these devices at a time of their
choosing.”).
51
Id.
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older hardware even harbors legacy malware such as the “Misfortune
Cookie.”52 In fact, in most cases, there’s a counterincentive to make the
security open—e.g. allow a back door53—in order to allow customer
service fixes and upgrades. Many individuals in the security community
are familiar with these openings.54 Regulators have begun to notice the
potential consequences of a breach or of publicly available private data
being used for unintended purposes.55
Finally, the system could simply fail. What happens when the
system is breached, data is leaked, or the system simply goes offline?
Doors, windows, and locks may open. Temperature controls may cause
unsafe low or high temperatures. Any evaluation of the efficacy of a
home monitoring system must include breach and failure analysis. A
failsafe mechanism, or default protocol, should be built into the system
so doors and windows remain secure.56
In evaluating home monitoring systems, one must also balance
security and safety concerns. In many people’s minds, security and safety
52

See Robert Vamosi, Attack of the Home Router, DARKMATTERS (May 27,
2015), http://darkmatters.norsecorp.com/2015/05/27/attack-of-the-home-router/
(“Last December, US-CERT at the Department of Homeland Security
warned broadband router manufacturers of a common vulnerability, dubbed
‘“Misfortune Cookie.’” This vulnerability had actually been patched more than
10 years ago, but was still present on many deployed devices.”).
53
A list of home router models with backdoors was started at https://github.com
/elvanderb/TCP-32764/blob/master/README.md (last visited Dec. 27, 2015).
54
IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 74–75, ll. 18–25, 1–10 (“And so I did a talk
this year at a security conference on breaking cameras, like the ones we have in
this room. And these devices range from cheap consumer cameras, you know 30
dollars, 50 dollars, up through 1,000 dollar cameras, 1,000 a piece. And I didn't
have to do anything special to break into them. They had backdoor accounts left
on them. They had simple vulnerabilities that anyone in the security community
who looked at it would be able to break. And it doesn't take a lot of technical
expertise to do that. And I think the real reason why these exist, why we have
these problems in embedded devices is there is no financial incentive to
companies to make their devices secure. The example I always throw out is,
when is the last time you saw a bad review on Amazon because some product
had a security vulnerability? Never.” (quoting Craig Heffner, security researcher
with Tactical Network Solutions)).
55
See id., at 12–13, ll. 25, 1–6. Regulatory scrutiny started with the FTC’s
TRENDnet's investigation but is unlikely to end there.
56
Id. at 348–49, ll. 19–25, 1 (“[A]t that point, the design should take into
account what happens when the service does get shut down or when the Internet
is unavailable. If the Internet is unavailable, you shouldn't be locked out of your
house. Consequently, if the Internet is unavailable, your lock shouldn't fail [to]
open, and therefore people would be able to walk into your house.” (quoting
Marc Rogers, Principal Security Researcher at Lookout, Inc.)).
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are synonymous. However, if a home monitoring system contains twofactor authentication to access the system, there is a delay in uploading
data to the system, which may decrease the level of safety in, for
example, an emergency response system. The risk of security leaks is not
just that privacy may be compromised, but that life and limb are in
danger. Emergency personnel responding to medical emergencies may
be delayed in their arrival at the home.

B. Security in the Home and Homeland Security
Increasingly, security in the home is the foundation for national
security. Looking to hack devices connected from people’s homes to the
Internet? Searches can be performed online,57 to find networked home
devices to hack, and can be done by anyone, including those with
commercial or political motives. Access to any one device can allow
access to an entire networked system, particularly when the device has
no password or security mechanism of its own. When hackers from
outside the United States reach home networks, they may find easier
access to personal data than they have in the past through the portals
established by government entities or large commercial operations in the
United States. Therefore, security begins at home, and in the home.
Indeed, there is a pending threat of cyberterrorism against home
monitoring systems if national security is dependent on the passwords
consumers enter into their home networks. “Passwords are the ‘keys to
the castle’ for important parts of our lives online,” yet they are often a
weak link in the security of home networks.58 In addition to data
collected by devices connected to the Internet, consumers are voluntarily
entering much of the private data collected by the home monitoring
devices, including entering their names, addresses, personal contacts,
medical information and other personal data in order to sign up for
services and activate the devices. One example would be in naming the
devices, or the sets of data, including using consumers’ and their
children’s names.59

57

See SHODAN, http://www.shodan.io (last visited Dec. 27, 2015) (“Shodan is
the world's first search engine for Internet-connected devices.”).
58
See Joseph Lorenzo Hall, The Beginning of the End of Passwords, CENTER
FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Oct. 21, 2014), https://cdt.org/blog/the-beginningof-the-end-of-passwords/ (last visited Dec 27, 2015) (“For something so
important, passwords have long been a poor fit: they are frequently stolen in
massive quantities, written down on post-it notes attached to the computers
they’re supposed to protect (please don’t do that!), and people choose passwords
that are way, way too simple (e.g., “password”).”).
59
IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 88–89, ll. 17–25, 1–3 (“[T]he consumers
actually add contextual data into the systems. So with our system as an example,
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Access to home monitoring devices can have devastating
consequences if left available for hacking and other malfeasance.60 As of
2014, hackers who were able to access Nest Labs devices did so with
physical, in-person access to the devices, rather than remotely.61 But the
possibility of remote and system-wide hacking remains, and is perhaps
imminent. The potential for cyberterrorism squeaks in at the home-based
level in a way few anticipate when they purchase a thermostat or other
home monitoring device. Marc Rogers, the Principal Security Researcher
at Lookout, Inc., a mobile security company, has speculated that, “a
connected thermostat is something of a device that can provide intel of
what's going on inside your house, when your house is empty and, if
harnessed into a large community of things, can even be used as a
weapon to attack critical infrastructure.”62 Homeland security may have
stronger passwords, but the federal government may fail to realize its
citizens’ security is dependent on this fundamental weakness in home
security.
Easy access to home monitoring data is not all bad, however.
The United States government may want to access home monitoring data
to monitor its own citizens to avoid cyberterrorism, and to protect against
threats from inside and outside the country. Governments may be
interested in accessing the individual data collected by home monitoring
devices, transforming it into collective big data, and using it to protect
entire cities and states. The use of near real-time analytics of this data go
beyond alerting paramedics about individual emergencies, such as a

consumers get to group devices by room, for example. And so you can tell at my
house, by looking at the data that we have in our system, right, I have my
daughters' rooms. And what are they named? My daughters' names, right?
Caitlin's room and Claire's room, et cetera, right? And there are motion sensors
in those rooms. So access to that data would tell you my childrens' names and
whether they are in their room or not. It's very, very private information.”
(quoting Jeff Hagins of SmartThings)).
60
Id. at 105, ll. 5–16 (“[C]onnected lightbulbs tend to have no security
whatsoever, but the connected door lock tends to have more security, right?
Because the manufacturer doesn't perceive, and rightly so, that the lightbulb
should be secure. And so they put a lot more energy into securing the doorlock
than they do the lightbulb. And the question becomes whether that is -- is that an
okay thing from a consumer perspective, right, that somebody can drive along in
front of my house and hijack my lights, right? Which is completely doable.”
(quoting Jeff Hagins of SmartThings)).
61
Lily Hay Newman, Pretty Much Every Smart Home Device You Can Think of
Has Been Hacked, SLATE (Dec. 30, 2014, 4:38 PM), http://www.slate.com
/blogs/future_tense/2014/12/30/the_Internet_of_things_is_a_long_way_from_be
ing_secure.html (listing IoT devices that have been hacked, and how).
62
IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 304, ll. 17–22.
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pending strokes, to alerting city services about group emergencies, such
as potential heat stroke due to a power failure.63
Nevertheless, government access may be troublesome. As noted
by Lee Tien from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, in comments for
the FTC IoT workshop in 2013, “[although] we are not discussing
government surveillance today, . . . anyone who thinks about the privacy
issues thoughtfully, is going to have an eye on what data about
household activities or personal activities the government could end up
obtaining, either directly from the devices or from IoT providers,
whether using legal process or other less savory means.”64

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR ADVERTISING AND OTHER THIRD-PARTY
USES
A. Advertising and Marketing Private Home Monitoring Data
While security issues establish the foundation for consumer
privacy, there are several unique privacy issues associated with access to
consumer data by home monitoring device companies and their
subcontractors. For example, advertising and marketing companies are
keen to access personal data in the home in a way previously
unimagined. Third-party distribution of home monitoring data is likely to
result in targeted advertising by these companies.65 Connected
thermostats tell advertising companies who is home, and when, based on
pre-programmed temperatures for the home. This information can be
used to send ads, via the home monitoring devices or other media, to
consumers in the home.
The most pervasive home monitoring may be in the form of
entertainment devices such as televisions. Smart televisions and gaming
consoles collect consumer data from the users for the purposes of
establishing an account. They also collect data at myriad data points
during television viewing and game play. In particular, there are newer,
emotive interfaces for voice and gestural input that collect “personal”

63

See Erin Bush, FAQs About Neustar and Our Assistance to Law Enforcement,
BLOG (July 17, 2012), https://www.neustar.biz/blog/faq-neustarassistance-law-enforcement (noting the government’s longstanding relationship
with Neustar, a real-time information analytics company).
64
IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 68, ll. 10–18.
65
Id. at 364, ll. 9–15 (“Now again, I'm not saying this is happening today, but it
would surprise me if we had this entire multi-billion, you know, enumerated
Internet of Things and no effort were made for your refrigerator to maybe
suggest that you should get some ice cream with the milk that you've just run out
of.” (quoting Ryan Calo of the University of Washington Law School)).
NEUSTAR
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data beyond that directly entered into the screen.66 This data can go
beyond what the thermostat does to send data about who is home and
when. This data will tell advertisers who is lonely, who is hungry, and, of
course, who is interested in the shopping channels. The key issue here is
that this information may be transmitted to third parties without notice.
For example, Cnet noted in February 2015, that “Samsung's Smart TV
privacy policy… warns that customers should ‘be aware that if your
spoken words include personal or other sensitive information, that
information will be among the data captured and transmitted to a third
party through your use of Voice Recognition.”67
In the near future, smart home appliances and monitoring
devices will become more like computers. Consumers may view home
appliances as designed for the historical purpose, but engineers “view a
refrigerator really as a 72 inch computer . . . that just happens to keep
your food cold.”68 Each and every connected device captures vast
quantities of data, and it is either used by the companies collecting the
data, uploaded to the Internet, or both. Video cameras and video capture
devices, in particular, collect such significant quantities of data that
camera companies are enthusiastic about using the data in new and
interesting ways.69

66

IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 86, ll. 12–22 (“But these gaming
technologies are ushering in a tremendous amount of sensory collection and
capture in the living room, right? Between voice commands and machines that
are active that are able to listen and detect whether or not particular words are
being stated in the room. They contain biometric technology, so they can do
some level of face recognition and other kind of avatar recognition for
personality. This is, I think, one of the most interesting factors for bringing this
kind of connectivity and technology into the home.” (quoting Lee Tien of EFF)).
67
Dan Graziano, Disable this Feature to Stop Your Samsung Smart TV from
Listening to You, CNET (Feb. 10, 2015, 3:34 PM), http://www.cnet.com/howto/samsung-smart-tv-spying/.
68
IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 59, ll. 4–6.
69
Jared Newman, The Future of Consumer Tech is About Making You
Forget It’s There, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 27, 2015, 6:00 AM),
https://www.fastcompany.com/3042948/sector-forecasting/the-future-ofconsumer-tech-is-about-making-you-forget-its-there (“‘It's really important to
not think of video and photo capture as an independent thing to do on the
device,’ Prober says. ‘It's really, “What do you do with the content when it's
captured?”’ . . . That question will become even more important as new tools
like 360-degree cameras become available. Suddenly, you have a lot more
footage to work with, which means cameras will need to get smarter at helping
you tell the best story.” (quoting CJ Prober, GoPro's senior vice president of
software and services)).
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Granted, smart appliances are alluring. For example, a consumer
using these appliances does not need to expend energy ensuring her room
remains at a comfortable temperature. Wink, Nest, and Personal
Emergency Response Systems (PERS) all rely on this essential
transaction: enter some personal data, a little or a lot, very private or not
so private, and you will see a fruitful and possibly instantaneous return
on your investment. The needle will move on your valuable personal
comfort – you will feel the warmth of connection, of safety, or of the air
in the room. The smarter a consumer wants the device to be, the more
she must feed it with her identity or personal information.
Indeed, the quantity of data created by even a small subset of
home monitoring devices connected to the Internet is enormous.70 To
compile the data, at this point there are more devices communicating
with the network than individuals communicating with the network, and
the number of connected devices is increasing rapidly.71 The number of
devices connected to the Internet has been facilitated by the move from
IP v4 to IP v6 and the consequential greater capacity for IP addresses72 to
associate with each device. Further, the ability not only to capture large
quantities of data but also to process such data in real time73 compounds
the need to address privacy concerns at this juncture.
70

IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 89, ll. 3–10, 14–22 (“We have less than
10,000 households today, so we are a startup. We just started selling actively at
the end of August. Less than 10,000 households using our product, we generate
150 million discrete data points a day out of those 10,000 households. It's an
enormous amount of data, most of which would put everybody to sleep . . . Most
of the data is not meaningful or useful to anyone, and yet, as I've said, there's a
lot of — you can get the entire context of my home. Who is home, what rooms
are occupied, the comings and goings of the family. There is an enormous
amount of data coming out the house that has to be protected. And certainly I'm
at the forefront of this as an industry, but as a consumer, I get very concerned
about that data.” (quoting Jeff Hagins of SmartThings)).
71
Id. at 7, ll. 10–23 (“Five years ago, for the first time, more things than people
connected to the Internet. By 2020, an estimated 90 percent of consumer cars
will have some sort of vehicle platform, up from 10 percent today. And it is
estimated that, by 2015, there will be 25 billion things hooked up to the Internet.
By 2020, we are told the number will rise to 50 billion . . . [including the
capacity to] help us remotely monitor an aging family member . . . .”(quoting
Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman of the FTC)).
72
Id. at 142, ll. 20–23 (“[I]n February of 2011, we ran out of the IP version 4
32-bit address space, so we standardized in 1996 an IP version 6 128-bit address
space.” (quoting Vint Cerf, Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist for
Google)).
73
WHITE HOUSE INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT, BIG DATA: SEIZING
OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 2 (Feb. 2015), https://www
.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/20150204_Big_Data_Seizing_Opportun
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This increased capacity to transmit data means that more data
will be collected and stored from a larger variety of devices. With the
increase in the types of data collection devices, this enhanced capacity
will result in vast databases filled with personal information. To the
extent each new home monitoring technology is added to a platform of
connected devices, the incremental creep of additional devices and the
barely perceptible change in privacy depletion may not be noticeable or
quantifiable. A consumer might say, “I have a television remote and a
mobile phone and it is the same technology,” generating some
enthusiasm for Apple brand iWatches.74 Watches, in particular, are a
familiar mode of technology interaction for older generations of
individuals, and may therefore be particularly effective in gently
reminding the elderly user to take pills and eat, in addition to serving as
an alert device for falls and other in-home emergencies.75 But the more
data available, the more industry will step up to use this data for positive
aspects (individual and collective safety), negative ones (surveillance,
hacking), and uses that can go either way (hyper-targeted marketing,
insurance design).
Home monitoring data may indeed be used for positive social
purposes. Initially, advertisers could collect home monitoring data
related to door locks to see who might be interested in insurance or alarm
systems. Then neighborhood watch organizations could use individual
home monitoring data collected by marketing databases for alerts.
Additionally, the FTC touts the wonderful benefits to energy
conservation if, “[i]n the home, for example, smart meters can enable
energy providers to analyze consumer energy use and identify issues
with home appliances, ‘even alerting homeowners if their insulation
seems inadequate compared to that of their neighbors,’ thus empowering
ities_Preserving_Values_Memo.pdf (“[D]ata analysis is increasingly conducted
in speeds approaching real time.”).
74
John Melloy, Apple May Sell 1 Billion ‘Life-Saving’ Watches, CNBC (Mar. 9,
2015,
1:31
PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/102488957?__source=xfinity|mod&par=xfinity
(Explaining that during the final stages of the initial draft of this paper, Apple
released the Apple iWatch, widely touted as a “life saving device.”). Query
whether wearable self-monitoring devices will replace home monitoring systems
entirely or merely interact with them.
75
Lively 24/7 Emergency Medical Alert System, LIVE!Y, http://www.mylively.
com/how-it-works (last visited Dec. 27, 2015) (“Simply plug the Lively hub into
a power outlet—it just starts working. Then place activity sensors around the
home, activate the account online and start wearing the watch. No home Internet
connection or phone line is required. It’s that simple . . . The clip and monthly
auto fall-detection monitoring service will be available in late 2015 for a
nominal additional charge.”).
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consumers to ‘make better decisions about how they use electricity.”76
Comparative data is used to show whether one’s home is using more or
less electricity than the neighborhood or city average.
But it doesn’t take a vivid imagination to wonder what other data
may be shared with the neighbors. IoT devices collect a much greater
quality and quantity of data; a standard model of notice and consent for
use may not be able to encompass the potential uses and misuses of this
data.77

B. Notice and Consent for Marketing Use
Standard notice and consent requirements are over-inclusive in
the sense that they ask for notice and consent where the consumer may
not necessarily be interested. For example, a home monitoring consumer
may only use the camera function for video, but not audio. As a result of
the lengthy and possibly irrelevant language in privacy policies, few
consumers read notices and fewer read them thoroughly.
More importantly, the policies may also be under-inclusive in the
sense that they notify consumers that data will be collected without fully
fleshing out the types of data that will be collected, or how the data will
be used.78 Familiar technologies, such as a camera, may be used to collect
data in unfamiliar ways. Nest’s Dropcam camera collects environmental
data as follows: “We collect data from several sensors built into Nest
Cam. These sensors collect data such as camera temperature and ambient
light in the room. By recording this information, Nest Cam can know, for
instance, whether it’s dark and it should turn on night vision . . . . We
may process information from your camera so that we can send you
alerts when something happens.”79 This is arguably beyond a camera’s
obvious purpose of simply recording what it sees, and may lead to a host
of “surprise” uses of the data yet to be imagined.
The way information is gathered on devices present additional
challenges to the notice and consent model. The information is provided
as a continuous flow rather than provided in bursts of information or with

76

IOT CONNECTED WORLD, supra note 3, at 8 (citations omitted).
See Section III.C infra for further discussion of imaginable misuses.
78
IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 322, ll. 14-22 (“The other thing is also to
make sure the consumer understands what data is being collected. It's one thing
to say that data is being collected, but it's another thing to say that actually we
are collecting your telephone number, we are collecting your birthdate, we are
collecting your sex. You have to be very clear about it so that they can
understand what the implications of that data being shared are.” (quoting Marc
Rogers of Lookout, Inc.)).
79
Nest Privacy Statement, supra note 20.
77
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a digital transmission by the consumer.80 When this information is
provided continuously, there are fewer opportunities for user interface
and input, and therefore fewer opportunities to interact with the
consumers and obtain consent for use of their data. Small consumer
devices such as smart light bulbs may have no screens for user interface.
Devices may be updated by the system automatically without user notice
and consent. The window of opportunity for notice and consent may be
lost for short-term use of disposable products that create a long trail of
data and fill the databases with personal information.
There’s a significant logistical effort involved in notices for
home monitoring devices as well. Notice has at least two triggers in the
home monitoring application. One, can any reasonably simple and
understandable notice cover what the data is actually used for?81 And
two, how do we provide notice when there’s no user interface on the
device?82 The FTC is aware of this issue and cautions, “[s]taff
acknowledges the practical difficulty of providing choice when there is
no consumer interface and recognizes that there is no one-size-fits-all
approach. Some options include developing video tutorials, affixing QR
codes on devices, and providing choices at point of sale, within set-up
wizards, or in a privacy dashboard.”83 Particular attention will be needed
80

IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 123, ll. 6–13 (“This notion of continuous
monitoring, which came up very briefly in the panel discussion, is important for
several reasons, not the least of which that continuously monitoring things tells
you about the processes in a much more refined way then if you showed up at
the doctor once every six months or once every three months or only when
you're sick.” (quoting Vint Cerf of Google)).
81
Id. at 98–99, ll. 21–25, 1–8 ( “Whereas there are so many examples today of
cases where information is getting shared, like how many people have pushed
the button to say "okay" on a notice from your phone that says such-and-such
application wants access to your location. And you say, okay. Well, what's it
doing with that information, right? And does it mean that the phone is just
accessing the location, that the application is only accessing the location local to
the phone or is it accessing that location information and shipping it off
somewhere? And the answer is, you don't know. But you've said okay.” (quoting
Jeff Hagins of SmartThings)).
82
Id. at 99, ll. 12–25 (“And that's assuming, you know, that the device even has
any kind of an interface for the user, right? Many of the devices -- I think many
of the devices we would be looking at, especially with smaller ones, I mean, we
already have display problems even with the machine that is designed to show
you all sorts of things. The idea that anyone would -- you can't do 80 screens, it
doesn't make sense. And if it is an alarm clock, that is not actually going to be
providing any sort of direct notice. You know, the entire sort of notice and
choice aspect of Fair Information Practices has a real breakdown with a lot of
these kinds of built-in devices.” (quoting Lee Tien of EFF)).
83
IOT CONNECTED WORLD, supra note 3, at v.
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to address the needs of the older populations in their willingness to use
certain technologies for notice and consent, and ADA-like access for
elderly disabled consumers should be embedded in each of these possible
alternatives to text notices. Additionally, user interface notice and
consent procedures may have to be re-formulated to encompass notice on
multiple platforms: app, device, smartphone, console, laptop, etc.
Not all privacy policies and terms of use address third party use
of information. If they do, the terms of the notice and consent may be
broad enough to encompass some rather socially abhorrent practices. As
a consequence, marketers may make use of personal data as described
herein, and without restriction. In addition, there is the specter of concern
about use of third party data for insurance purposes. Insurers would be
eager to gather personal data in the home either ostensibly by an insurer
providing the device and collecting the data, or by the insurer
“piggybacking” on existing data. In addition to concerns about
blacklisting certain customers, or redlining certain neighborhoods, the
insurer might make the disclosure of such data a precondition to
obtaining insurance or obtaining a lower rate for existing service.84 In
early 2015, an insurer offered customers exactly that deal.85 It is difficult,
given the United States legal framework of contract law inclusive of
notice and consent, to argue that these uses of personal data are “illegal”
or beyond the scope of the implied contract. Assuming notice was given
properly and consent was obtained within the context of U.S. contract
law, the use has been considered fair.
Consumers, especially older or burdened consumers, may want
to read a privacy notice for a single device or website, or perhaps even a
few, but when home monitoring devices become embedded in nearly
every household appliance, consumers are unlikely to read and consent
effectively to each privacy notice. Furthermore, home monitoring
presents different challenges for notice of collection for able-bodied
individuals and for senior/disabled product offerings. In order to
calculate a cost-benefit ratio for consent for the adoption of IoT devices
in the home, society must look at the benefits of such devices. One of the
84

IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 211, ll. 14–22 (“[Y]ou could start to see a
home insurer, for example -- I mean, I love the General Electric example this
morning of leaving your -- you know, your stove telling you you are leaving
your stove on. Well, I'm pretty sure my home insurer would love to know that, if
I was routinely doing that. Could they, as a condition of my insurance, require
me to have my appliances share that information with them?” (quoting Scott
Peppet, a professor at the University of Colorado Law School)).
85
Jose Pagliery, Would You Wear a Tracker to Get an Insurance
Discount?, CNN (Apr. 8, 2015, 5:23 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/04
/08/technology/security/insurance-data-tracking/.
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primary benefits is automation of data collection and upload, i.e. that the
consumer does not need to manually transmit the information.
The differentials for consent include impaired consent or family
consent for patient, authentication and identification problems, and data
retention lifespan issues. How can we ascertain notice and consent for an
elderly patient on the Alzheimer’s spectrum or in the early stages of
dementia? Obtaining effective consent from an elderly patient would fall
under the auspices of elder law rather than privacy law, once notice is
given. If someone other than the user has purchased a system for a
disabled patient, who is the user for authentication and access purposes?
Likewise, the notice might have to switch from the data collection
subject to the purchaser/user depending on the capacity to consent issues
raised by elder law and disability law. Data retention presents a
somewhat lesser burden for the elderly than for students, who are fully in
possession of many of the rights and responsibilities of adults but have
also the right to be forgotten under erasure laws for those under 18 years
old.
The FTC has tried to minimize the burden of endless notices by
limiting them to unexpected uses, with the following guidance: “For uses
that would be inconsistent with the context of the interaction (i.e.,
unexpected), companies should offer clear and conspicuous choices.”86
Conversely, the latest bill proposed by the current administration
proposes that if the use is exactly what the customer asked for,
companies may presume notice and consent.87

C. Imagined Harms for Unimagined Uses
IoT home monitoring devices designed to save lives or at least
improve comfort may collect data beyond what is necessary to provide
the service. As the technology expands beyond use by the elderly and
disabled users to the broader population, this very personal in-home
collection of data may be used for financial gain by third parties.
There are concerns that only rich individuals and families will
benefit from home monitoring. Perhaps, conversely, the poor may be
monitored more intensely, either through “voluntary” economic
incentives or individual necessity.88 There is very little regulatory
86

Id. at vi.
WHITE HOUSE DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS ACT, supra note
31, at 8 (“Personal data processing that fulfills an individual’s request shall be
presumed to be reasonable in light of context.”).
88
IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 212, ll. 8–12 (“I'm not sure this is really a
problem of an economic divide, like the poor aren't going to be able to get
enough sensors. I think the poor are likely to have sensors imposed on them, far
87
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prohibition of economic discrimination based on the collection of data
through home monitoring devices, as long as it is accurate.89 Although
elderly and disabled users may, in theory, fall on either side of this
economic spectrum, they should be considered among those particularly
vulnerable to unimagined uses of their data. The elderly are vulnerable
because of their unfamiliarity with new technologies, and the disabled
are vulnerable because of their difficulty in using the technologies. These
concerns are amplified by the necessity of these technologies in the lives
of both the elderly and disabled.
A new bill proposes to address this issue of “disparate impact”
resulting from data analysis and targeted use.90 It remains to be seen,
however, whether simply raising or even proscribing this issue will
eliminate this sort of data analysis. There are “black box” algorithms,
designated trade secrets by the data analysis and advertising companies,
which protect advertisers’ rights to withhold information needed to
correctly police this issue.91
It may be premature to declare an absolute harm from
unimagined uses. Perhaps consumers would like to be delighted and
surprised by new uses and see them as improvements to the quality of
their lives. How should we measure this and obtain informed consent? A
“surprise me” check box option would capture the high-risk tolerance
population, but without further specification, few would choose this
more than everybody else.” (quoting Scott Peppet of University of Colorado
Law School)).
89
Peppet, supra note 29, at 128 (“[T]he FCRA is designed to ensure accuracy in
credit reports . . . Accuracy, however, is really not the problem with Internet of
Things sensor data. One’s Fitbit, driving, or smart home sensor data are
inherently accurate—there is little to challenge. What is more questionable are
the inferences drawn from such data . . . Thus, the FCRA provides consumers
with little remedy if Internet of Things data were to be incorporated into creditreporting processes.”).
90
WHITE HOUSE DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS ACT, supra note
31, at 9 (“Disparate Impact.—When analyzing personal data in a manner that is
not reasonable in light of context and results in adverse actions concerning
multiple individuals, a covered entity shall—Conduct a disparate impact
analysis to determine whether the analysis of personal data described in
subsection (d) results in a disparate impact on individuals on the basis of age,
race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, or
national origin.").
91
Our Data, Our Rules?, THE BRIAN LEHRER SHOW (Jan. 6, 2015),
http://www.wnyc.org/story/our-data-our-rules/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2015)
(Frank Pasquale, professor of law at U. Maryland, discussing his book, Blackbox
Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money and Information, available
at http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674368279).
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option. A company could offer proposed future uses in the notice, but
these may not be sufficiently definite to be construed as legallyenforceable contracts. So far, privacy notices have not been held to a
contract standard.92 Further, devices with multiple sensors in the home
can be combined to create new and highly intricate portraits of
individuals.93 In that sense, nearly every use is a surprise, or an
unintended use, because it can be combined with other data and/or
transferred to third parties via bankruptcy, merger, or acquisition.
Yet again, the collection and analysis of data may have a positive
effect on the individual generating the data. For example, normalization
of the individual’s data may occur. This happens when data is
streamlined to yield a “normal” value representing the individual’s
comfort zone, used by the system as a default. The effect will be
immediate when an aberrant temperature in the home creates an alert that
causes the home’s resident to change or normalize the temperature, either
through manual adjustment or through a preset, programmed response.
Privacy is always an individual calculation. Privacy is still
important to older users of home monitoring devices, but the calculation
may result in a different decision. For elderly users, the ability to be
identified and located is an important value if the purpose is to get
immediate attention. Individually worn healthcare devices can identify
individuals with great certainty.94 Wearable devices are luxurious rather
than necessary for functioning in society, unless they are fall alerts
connected to a home monitoring service, which become nearly a
necessity for a fragile, elderly individual. In the future, geo-location and
identification devices may become functionally or literally invaluable as
they become the foundation for receiving emergency medical care.
Vulnerable consumers may welcome this development, or may choose
92

See Dyer v. Northwest Airlines Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D.
2004); Daniel Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUMBIA L. REV. 583, 595–97 (2014) (finding that
privacy policies, unlike terms-of-use documents, are typically perceived as noncontractual in nature).
93
Peppet, supra note 29, at 93 (citation omitted) (“Just as two eyes generate
depth of field that neither eye alone can perceive, two Internet of Things sensors
may reveal unexpected inferences. For example, a fitness monitor’s separate
measurements of heart rate and respiration can in combination reveal not only a
user’s exercise routine, but also cocaine, heroin, tobacco, and alcohol use, each
of which produces unique biometric signatures. Sensor fusion means that on the
Internet of Things, ‘every thing may reveal everything.’”).
94
IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 170–71, ll. 24–25, 1–2 (“Ira Hunt, who is the
CIO of the CIA said you can be 100 percent identified, as an individual, by your
Fitbit data. Why? Because no two persons' gaits or ways of moving are the
same.” (quoting Scott Peppet of University of Colorado Law School)).
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lower-tech options that may be more expensive and/or less supportive of
their needs in order to protect their privacy in a largely unregulated field.
In fact, consumers may not be fully aware of privacy and
security flaws or be able to fix them even if their awareness of such
issues is fully developed.95 The FTC, and indeed the entire U.S.
government, takes a stance on the issue of privacy and security that relies
on the assumption that educating the consumer will solve every flaw in
the system. The solution may be to make consumers aware of the issue,
but also to rely on developers to close the security gaps.96 Developers can
close the gaps by adding privacy by design methodologies to product
design. The following section evaluates the efficacy of this hybrid
solution.

IV. POTENTIAL PRIVACY SOLUTIONS FOR HOME MONITORING
DEVICES, SERVICES, AND APPLICATIONS
A. Waiting for Developer Knights in Shining Armor
Developers have the ability to take constructive action before
products hit the market to prevent privacy violations and security
breaches. The process begins with quality assurance principles and
security by design. Security is a necessary precondition to privacy, and it
can be baked into home monitoring devices. There is value in
preconditioning home monitoring appliances to prevent both use outside
of acceptable parameters for the device and hacking.97 Technical

95

Id. at 77, ll. 4–17 (“Unfortunately, I don't think that trying to educate users
will get us where we need to be. You know, the mantra for years in computer
security has been educate the user, educate the user. Well, guess what? We've
had security problems for decades. That clearly isn't working. Users don't
understand the technologies they are dealing with. I hear the term, people always
say, people are so technologically — you know, they understand all this
technology. No, they don't. They have a phone with pictures on it and they point
at the pictures. That is not understanding technology. My 1-year-old can unlock
my phone. She has no idea what technology even means.” (quoting Craig
Heffner of Tactical Network Solutions)).
96
Id. at 77, ll. 18–21 (“So I think we really need to push vendors towards
security as these embedded systems come out and become more prevalent and,
in reality, they already are.” (quoting Craig Heffner of Tactical Network
Solutions)).
97
Id. at 106, ll. 10–17 (“So you can't set your range to 1,000 degrees. Somebody
can't set your refrigerator to 90 degrees and have all your food go bad and the
milk spoil. They only work within reasonable parameters that a consumer might
use the product for. So you can build that software into the devices themselves,
which further adds to the security and the safety in the system.” (quoting Mike
Beyerle of GE Appliances)).
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standards for secure design are available online and updated frequently.98
As a foundational matter, universities must educate developers to design
products that are not only beautiful and clever, but also secure.99
Companies should also hire engineers with security knowledge and
experience (not just generic software developers) to design and maintain
these programs.
In theory, consumers would only buy secure products that will
protect their privacy. In reality, market information on this subject is
scant and unreliable. Worse yet, there will always be certain consumers
who choose to buy less secure devices because they prefer cheaper or
trendier products. Therefore, designers of secure IoT solutions for the
home should evaluate the scalability of solutions up to network level and
down to consumer level. While securing data privacy may not be at the
forefront of a device engineer’s concerns,100 it should at least be on her
checklist.
For consumer-friendly options, designers and developers could
look to ADA standards for access to digital media, including mobile
devices. Microsoft has taken the initiative in this regard by not only
creating accessible options baked into its offerings, but also developing
instructional videos explaining how to use these options and posting
them on YouTube.101 Both developers and consumers can access and use
accessibility options to allow users with sensory disabilities to effectively
use the service. In the case of IoT devices, notices for privacy may lean
on these for platforms that support IoT devices, or use these
methodologies as guidance for direct device use.

98

See Standards for M2M and the Internet of Things, Published Specifications,
http://www.onem2m.org/technical/published-documents (last visited
Mar. 9, 2015).
99
See e.g., MSIT in Privacy Engineering, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY,
http://privacy.cs.cmu.edu/ (introducing Carnegie Mellon’s Master of Science in
Information Technology – Privacy Engineering program).
100
Cliff Ortmeyer, IoT Privacy: Engineering Fault, Not User Issue, EBN
(Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.ebnonline.com/author.asp?section_id=3507&doc
_id=277329&page_number=1 (“Between the development of IoT standards, the
selection of wireless technologies, and the adoption of an appropriate Internet
Protocol, most engineers are still wrapped up in the basic infrastructure of IoT.
As a result, more abstract ideas such as personal privacy can quickly fall by the
wayside.”).
101
See Microsoft, Quick Tutorials, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.
com/playlist?list=PLtSVUgxIo6KoI5ogCBZuAjB6HprjiaKNM (last updated
Feb. 6, 2015).
ONEM2M,
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B. Personal Protection and Decision-Making
Individual activities and precautions may be the final frontier for
home network security. Developers can implement privacy and security
by design. Companies can offer privacy-protective products and services.
Ultimately, the future of privacy and security will depend on consumers
paying attention to and paying for privacy. Consumers will learn to pay
more for products where privacy protections will have been incorporated
into their products by design. On their end, consumers must look beyond
password entry. The security levels of network password protocols have
been covered at length, and are beyond the scope of this article. In this
article, a home-based solution is explained.
Generally, home monitoring devices are on the lax end of the
security spectrum vis-à-vis commercially-networked devices, as the latter
can rely on platform-based security solutions. This lack of baked-in
security and privacy controls leaves consumers, by default, in charge of
their own security. Consumers are not helpless to defend themselves
against privacy intrusions, but they must take action.
Consumers can input effective password protection, if the feature
is available on the home monitoring device. If they have password
thresholds at all, then there is a need to notify or even require customers
to re-set default passwords. For newer devices, consumers may be able
to use biometric or other alternatives to passwords, such as encryption
for uploaded video feeds102 and other protection of data in transit to ramp
up privacy protections.
Consumers can limit the amount of data entered into the device,
a sort of data minimization on the ground level. Also, consumers can
take action to delete their data on any given system, assuming it has not
been shared pursuant to the consent or other exceptions listed on the
privacy policy for that device.103 Indeed, consumers of IoT equipment
102

Klint Finley, Stalk Yourself at Home with this Free App, WIRED (Mar. 16,
2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/03/app-lets-stalk-home/ (“It’s
hard not to worry about uploading video footage from your house to the cloud,
but Maslan says that all the video is encrypted so that not even Camio’s
engineers can access it (though it’s not possible to verify this without auditing
Camio’s servers). For people uploading video that’s not particularly sensitive –
such as publicly viewable areas such as their front yards — this might not be a
big deal. Everyone else will need to take a leap of faith.”).
103
Nest Privacy Statement, supra note 20 (“You can delete the information on
the Nest device by resetting it to the defaults (using Reset in the Settings menu).
You can access, amend or delete your personal information from Nest’s servers
through the controls in your account. Because of the way we maintain certain
Services, after your information is deleted, backup copies may linger for some
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can interconnect their devices to a secure platform, or at least a secure
home network.104 Even these simple steps, however, may be onerous for
the oldest users, and baked-in privacy by design and security by design
are superior offerings.
There may be technical solutions that can be implemented on the
home network level by individual consumers. This could be done
through add-on products that protect a set of home monitoring devices as
a wider system.105 At least one company offers such a service.106 Such
platforms that manage home security and monitoring systems are
proliferating, offering users additional choices to make simpler choices
in the future with regard to privacy notices. Privacy controls could be
done once for the platform rather than for each standalone device.
Ideally, privacy notices will offer users a choice to revoke or revise their
privacy level elections as their understanding or situation changes.
The most significant downside to platform-based home
monitoring controls is that the platform, which houses all the aggregated
data, provides a single point of entry for hackers. Even if that point is
more secure than each of the standalone devices, hackers may still be
successful. Also, there are limitations on a platform-level security
barrier, including the ability of applications to collect data outside

time before they are deleted, and we may retain certain data for a longer period
of time if we are required to do so for legal reasons.”).
104
See How to Secure Your Wireless Home Network, WIKIHOW,
http://www.wikihow.com/Secure-Your-Wireless-Home-Network (last visited
Dec. 27, 2015) (Noting that simple instructions are available online for making a
home network more secure.).
105
IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 216–17, ll. 12–25, 1 (“Something that I
would like to see exist is something I put on my home network before my cable
router, DSL modem, or whatever, that allows me, in bulk, to anoint certain kinds
of data that flows forth from my house. So that's a way of sort of aggregating
consent-like stuff. It sounds a lot like DuoTrack, it sounds like other things like
ad identifiers and things like that. And you would need some basic standard so
that telehealth companies that do anything related to the Internet of Things could
mark certain packets as, here's the thing, here's what it is trying to do, so that
you could then preclude certain data from flowing forward. It's not a perfect
solution, but it might help.” (quoting Joseph Lorenzo Hall of CDT)).
106
Bitdefender BOX, BITDEFENDER, http://www.bitdefender.com/box/ (last
visited Dec. 27, 2015) (“Advanced Threat Protection: Not just for your
computers. Everything. Once connected to the Internet, every device, even
Smart TVs, smart appliances like fridges, thermostats or gaming consoles are
vulnerable to malware that silently does its work. BOX protects everything else
that’s in the home: PCs, Macs, Android and iOS tablets and phones alike. Just
like an antivirus for your home network.”).
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platform parameters and the need to pre-identify known threats.107 Data
anonymization, meaning masking the personally-identifying aspects of
data, has some utility but in reality it reduces functionality when the
purpose of this data is to identify, locate, and potentially save the life of
an individual user. Data minimization is an underutilized technique.
Applying “just in time” saving strategies from manufacturing to data
privacy principles would result in a “just enough data” to do the job.
Data beyond the requisite amount needed for functionality should not be
collected, analyzed, and/or stored.

C. Expansion of Existing Regulations to Cover Data Gathered by
Home Monitoring Devices
HIPAA provides a model to evaluate future regulation of home
monitoring in some cases. HIPAA regulation was expanded in 2013 to
include the Business Associate (BA) agreement requirement, aiming to
encompass business associates who contract with covered entities.108 In
the transcript of the FTC workshop on IoT, Lee Tien of EFF noted that,
for a California proposal, “[w]e also use rules that are modeled after
HIPAA business associate type rules, so that downstream recipients of
data shared from the utilities are bound in a similar way.”109
HIPAA could be expanded again to include under its regulatory
umbrella any business that captures, processes, and stores health data.
Under this scenario, medically significant, extremely private data will
have some protection. Just as HIPAA was expanded in 2013 in response
to concerns about new technology for accessing data via additional
systems, it could be expanded incrementally over the next few years to
encompass personal health data emanating from home monitoring
devices collecting information.

107

Molly Wood, CES: Security Risks from the Smart Home, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/technology/personaltech/cessecurity-risks-from-the-smart-home.html?mwrsm=Email&_r=1 (“But as with
most antivirus and anti-malware products, the box can scan for and detect only
code that has already been identified as a threat. Something new could still
sneak through. And the box can’t do anything about the personal data harvested
by all the various apps that control smart devices in the home or outside of it.”).
108
The HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules regulated health care providers,
health plans and companies that process health insurance claims. Revisions to
the original rules added business associates of these companies that have access
to protected health information, including the covered entities’ contractors and
subcontractors. http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredent
ities/businessassociates.html.
109
IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 70, ll. 4–7.
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The expansion of HIPAA still leaves the routine data of climate,
location, and home occupant data unprotected. To that end, the staff of
the FTC would like Congress to go beyond mere security breach
notifications, which they believe would better protect the security of data
and thereby allow health care monitoring and support devices to function
properly.110
Pending federal bills would create a coherent scheme for
protecting data and establishing breach notifications. For example a
proposal from the White House suggests that covered entities for privacy
protections be expanded to cover any “person that collects, creates,
processes, retains, uses, or discloses personal data in or affecting
interstate commerce,”111 a much broader standard that could include
home monitoring devices and platforms. Enforcement capabilities under
the White House proposal would rest with the FTC under its traditional
authority to protect consumers.112 The bills reflect a trend towards
broader responsibility for data collection, processing, and storage. This
would address the current issue of possible home monitoring privacy
legislation being too specific. Even IoT privacy legislation may be too
specific to gain broad-based political support.113

CONCLUSION
Now is the time to evaluate potential home monitoring
regulation and its alternatives. But while we wait for pending
developments at the federal level on consumer privacy and data security,
consumers can make market choices and personal choices with their data
that serves to protect them. At this point, consumers have begun to weigh
the options presented to them in the world of IoT, and its entry into their
homes. They should continue to make informed choices about their
privacy before a breach occurs. To begin, some people might opt out of
using home monitoring devices. These individuals might prefer to incur
110

IOT CONNECTED WORLD, supra note 4, at vii–viii (“General data security
legislation should protect against unauthorized access to both personal
information and device functionality itself. For example, if a pacemaker is not
properly secured, the concern is not merely that health information could be
compromised, but also that a person wearing it could be seriously harmed.”).
111
WHITE HOUSE DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS ACT, supra note
44, at 1.
112
Id. (“A violation of Title I of this Act shall be treated as an unfair or
deceptive act or practice in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45).”).
113
Id. at vii (“IoT-specific legislation at this stage would be premature. Staff
also agrees that development of self-regulatory programs designed for particular
industries would be helpful as a means to encourage the adoption of privacyand security-sensitive practices.”).
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the more expensive cost of human care and monitoring. Some others may
choose less invasive devices that gather information but do not transmit
the information to the Internet.114 Others still may use commerciallyavailable or home-grown privacy protection devices that layer security
and privacy on top of home monitoring devices.
This is a transitional moment in the adoption timeline of home
monitoring technologies. In order to decide how much security and
privacy these devices need, we have to decide as a society where home
monitoring devices fit on the scale of importance, from equivalent to
national security or to the lesser standard of disposable and recreational
gadgets. TRUSTe, an online privacy management service, noted that
22% of consumers believe that the benefits of IoT devices outweigh the
risks to privacy.115 At this point, it is safe to assume that these devices
will be a part of home life for many of us. We must therefore act
accordingly to secure home monitoring systems from hacking and
unauthorized data collection.

114

The author of this paper has a non-IoT pedometer. Occasionally, the author
wears it.
115
TRUSTe Privacy Index: 2014 Internet of Things Edition, TRUSTE (2014),
http://www.truste.com/resources/privacy-research/us-Internet-of-things-index2014/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2015).

